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Bail Pending Trial: Changing
Interpretations of the Bail Reform
Act and the Importance of Bail
from Defense Attorneys’
Perspectives
Clara Kalhous and John Meringolo*
Introduction: The Importance of Bail for a Criminal Defendant
There is no constitutional right to bail.1 Yet, for an accused
person facing criminal charges in the United States,
particularly in the federal system, the denial of bail pending
trial constructively precludes the effective exercise of those
rights that are guaranteed by the United States Constitution
and poses a challenge to attorneys and members of the
judiciary, each of whom has sworn an oath to protect and
defend those rights.
For a federal defendant facing criminal charges, the court’s
decision to grant or deny bail pending trial has an impact on
every subsequent stage of the case. An incarcerated defendant
is substantially less able to assist in his2 own defense than one
Clara Kalhous graduated from Cardozo School of Law in January 2009 and
has spent the past three years engaged in the representation of criminal
defendants in the New York State and the federal courts at all stages of
pretrial and trial proceedings and on appeal. John Meringolo graduated from
New York Law School in 1999. Since 2003, he has represented clients in over
eighty federal cases in District Courts nationwide and in over 300 felony and
misdemeanor cases in New York and New Jersey state courts. John has
extensive experience defending clients in high-profile RICO indictments.
John teaches Trial Advocacy at New York Law School and Advanced Trial
Advocacy at Pace Law School. His recent publications include The Media, the
Jury, and the High-Profile Defendant: A Defense Perspective on the Media
Circus, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1069 (2011).
1. William Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L.
REV. 33, 34 (1977).
2. For legibility and concision the male pronoun is used throughout.
*
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whose freedom is unrestricted or only conditionally restricted
by conditions of home confinement. Effectively cut off from
communication with persons outside the detention facility, the
incarcerated defendant is unable to arrange meetings with
witnesses who could testify in his defense, to assist in the
investigation of his case, or to provide his attorney with the
facts to support a counter-narrative of the events leading to the
criminal charge(s) against him.
Moreover, the restrictions and institutional regulations
defense attorneys face when visiting clients at detention
centers impede the attorneys’ abilities to defend their clients
and, by creating logistical barriers to client contact, impede the
defense’s ability to fully investigate the facts giving rise to the
criminal indictment against the client. In a system where nine
in ten federal criminal cases end in a conviction,3 a denial of
pretrial release makes it all the more likely that a defendant
will plead guilty or that he will lose at trial. In addition,
convicted defendants who were denied bail before trial are
often sentenced to longer terms of incarceration than
defendants who were granted pretrial release.4
Starting from the premise that the court’s decision to grant
or deny bail has a fundamental impact on the outcome of a
criminal case, this Article analyzes the question of pretrial
release on bail from the perspective of the defense attorney,
with particular emphasis on the current law under the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 (the “1984 Act”). Part I considers the
history of bail in common law jurisdictions generally and the
history of bail in the United States before 1984 in particular,
with attention to the grounds on which pretrial release was
granted. Part II examines the legislative history and
enactment of the 1984 Act and the Act’s effect on pretrial
Bureau of Prison statistics indicate that 93.6 percent of federal inmates are
male. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, Quick Facts About the Bureau of Prisons,
http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp (last updated Apr. 21, 2012). However, the
arguments herein apply with equal force to the situation faced by female
defendants.
3. Mark Motivans, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 234184, FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS,
2009,
at
2
(2011),
available
at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf.
4. Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and
Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 339 n.33 (1990).
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release decisions. Part III discusses the Bail Reform Act from
defense attorneys’ perspectives and provides an overview
discussion of the recent decisions to release several high-profile
defendants on bail on various stringent conditions and
contrasts those cases with the denial of bail to defendants of
lesser financial means facing similar charges. Part IV briefly
considers the alternatives to pretrial detention, including home
detention, electronic and GPS monitoring, and release on
recognizance. Throughout, we have incorporated the views of
prominent defense attorneys whose reflections on their
experience defending clients who were denied pretrial release
constitute an important critique of the current system and call
into question the ability of the Bail Reform Act as applied by
federal district courts to adequately protect the constitutional
rights of the accused.
I.

The History of Bail

A. The Early English Laws
Bail in the federal system “is rooted in the belief that a
person who has not yet been convicted of a crime should
ordinarily not spend any extended period of time in jail.”5 The
current federal law in the United States, which is said to favor
pretrial release,6 originated in the Anglo-Saxon system in
which, until the Assize of Clarendon in 1166, all crimes were
bailable.7
Early Anglo-Saxon custom required an accused person to
provide a suretor whose monetary pledge served to guarantee
the appearance of the accused at trial as well as the payment of
the pledged monies to the aggrieved party upon conviction.8 If
5. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO.
98-1121, at 16 (1984).
6. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society
liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the
carefully limited exception”). But see Motivans, supra note 3, at 2, 10 (at the
end of the 2009 fiscal year, fifteen percent of federal inmates were pretrial
detainees; seventy-seven percent of federal defendants in cases that
terminated in 2009 had been detained pretrial at some point).
7. Duker, supra note 1, at 44.
8. Id. at 34-35. It has been noted that the early Anglo-Saxon bail process
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the accused fled, the pledge was forfeited by the suretor.9
Because the amount of the pledge was equal to the potential
penalty upon conviction, the “system necessarily linked the
amount of the pretrial pledge to the seriousness of the crime.” 10
In the eleventh century, the relationship between an accused
individual and his suretor was converted into a communitybased system in which all free men were required to maintain
membership in a hundred and a tithing—local government
units through which groups of men accepted responsibility for
each others’ actions.11
Following the Norman Conquest in 1066, the increasing
use of corporal punishment rather than monetary penalties
and the “growing delays between accusation and trial” led to
calls for reform.12 Because crime was no longer punishable by a
simple fine, the calculation of bail became more complicated.13
During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a complex
system of pretrial release on a series of summons, writs, and
pledges arose but quickly became rife with abuse; additionally,
the practice of the “hue and cry,” in which an accused felon was
executed without trial as soon as he was captured, effectively
eliminated the rights of the accused.14 In response, the twentyninth chapter of the Magna Carta, signed in 1215, provided
was “perhaps the last entirely rational application of bail. Since the amount
of the pledge and the possible penalty were identical, the effect of a successful
escape would have been a default judgment for the amount of the [pledged
monies]. To the extent the accused left behind sufficient property to pay the
[pledge], he would have had no incentive for flight. To the extent the surety
bore the financial responsibility for payment, he had every incentive to
ensure the appearance of the accused.” June Carbone, Seeing through the
Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the Administration
of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 520 (1983) (footnote omitted).
9. Duker, supra note 1, at 37-38.
10. Carbone, supra note 8, at 520.
11. Duker, supra note 1, at 38-39. This practice was continued following
the Norman Conquest. Under the Norman code, every free man was required
to join a “frankpledge” at the age of twelve, a system in which the members
provided surety for each other. Id. at 39. Failure to apprehend a member of
one’s frankpledge following wrongdoing by that individual led to collective
punishment of the group and provided a strong incentive for the maintenance
of societal order. Id.
12. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO.
98-1121, at 17 (1984); Carbone, supra note 8, at 522.
13. Carbone, supra note 8, at 522.
14. Duker, supra note 1, at 40-43.
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that “No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseised15 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or to
be outlawed, or any otherwise destroyed, but by lawful
Judgment of his Peers, or by the law of the Land.”16
Nearly simultaneously, at the Assize of Clarendon in 1166,
the writ de homine replegiando was enacted. The writ
“commanded the sheriff to release the individual detained
unless he were held for particular reasons,” thereby
establishing “the first written list of nonbailable offenses.”17
The final clause of the writ, which allowed the sheriff to deny
bail “for any . . . [wrong] for which according to English custom
he is not replevisable,”18 however, lent itself to abuse by the
sheriffs.
In response, in 1275, the English Parliament adopted the
Statute of Westminster, which classified all offenses for the
first time as either bailable or nonbailable and mandated
consideration of the nature of the offense, the probability of
conviction, and factors including the defendant’s “attempted
escape, bad repute, or comparable actions or characteristics
which rendered the offense nonbailable.”19
Thus, by mandating consideration of the characteristics of
the accused person and the likelihood of conviction, the Statute
of Westminster required a preliminary consideration of the
strength of the evidence against the accused as a proxy for the
likelihood of flight.20
The Statute of Westminster remained the governing law
(with emendations)21 until the Petition of Right in 1628.22 The
15. i.e., be wrongfully dispossessed of his freehold possession of property.
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 211-12 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
16. See Duker, supra note 1, at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. at 44.
18. Id. at 45 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (2d Pocket ed. 2001) (defining “personal
replevin” as “[a]t common law, an action taken to replevy a person out of
person or out of another’s custody.”).
19. Duker, supra note 1, at 45-46; Carbone, supra note 8, at 523; ROBERT
W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 98-1121, at 17
(1984).
20. Carbone, supra note 8, at 526-27.
21. H.R. REP. No. 98-1121, at 17.
22. See generally Duker, supra note 1, at 50-58 (discussing the
intervening changes to the right to bail).
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Petition was drafted in response to the decision in Darnel’s
Case,23 in which the courts “upheld the right of the king to jail
nobles who refused to lend him money, even though they had
no legal obligation to do so.”24 After intense parliamentary
negotiations, the King agreed to sign the Petition, which
“declared and enacted, That no Freeman may be taken or
imprisoned or be disseised of his freehold or liberties, . . . but
by lawful judgment of his peers, or by law of the land.”25 The
Petition of Right failed, however, to state a time limit within
which an accused person must be released on bail.26
To eliminate this loophole, in 1677, the Petition of Right
was amended by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1677, which
provided that an accused person who was denied bail and
brought a habeas corpus petition was entitled to have his
petition heard within three days after the service of the
petition and that:
[A]fter the Party shall be brought before them,
the said Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper, or
Justice or Baron before whom the Prisoner shall
be brought . . . , shall discharge the said prisoner
from his Imprisonment, taking his or their
Recognizance, with one or more Surety or
Sureties, in any Sum according to their
Discretion, having regard to the Quality of the
Prisoner and Nature of the Offense, for his or
their Appearance in the Court of the King’s
Bench . . . unless it shall appear . . . that the
Party [is] . . . committed . . . for such Matter or
Offenses for which by law the Prisoner is not
bailable.27
Thus, the right to bail was secured, but because the
amount of bail was not constrained in any manner; the
23. 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (1627 K.B.). See generally id. at 58-66 (discussion of
facts and holding in Darnel’s Case).
24. H.R. REP. No. 98-1121, at 17 (citing Duker, supra note 1, at 64).
25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. See Duker, supra note 1, at 65-66.
27. Id. at 66 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
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“Discretion” of the person hearing the petition was effectively
authorized to set prohibitively high bail.28 This last loophole
was corrected in 1689, with the Bill of Rights, which provided
that, in criminal cases, “excessive bail ought not to be
required.”29
At the dawn of American independence, the English
common law approach to bail as outlined in the Statute of
Westminster, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act of
1679, and the Bill of Rights of 1689 provided the framework for
the American laws.30
B. History of Bail Pending Trial in the U.S. from 1776 to 1966
The colonists brought the English laws with them and “the
early colonies applied [the Statute of Westminster] verbatim.”31
Early revisions to the colonies’ bail laws, however, liberalized
the requirements and the right to bail. For example, in 1641,
Massachusetts passed a statute providing an “unequivocal
right to bail for non-capital offenses.”32 Similarly, in 1682,
Pennsylvania adopted a constitutional provision “providing
that ‘all Prisoners shall be Bailable by Sufficient Sureties,
unless for capital Offenses, where proof is evident or the
presumption great.’”33 Pennsylvania’s formulation of the
standard for bail―proof evident or presumption great―became
the model for many states.34
Throughout this period, considerations of the evidence
against the accused (i.e., the likelihood of conviction) and of the
severity of the charged offense remained the most important
factors in the courts’ bail decisions.35 These factors were
28. Id.
29. Id. (where “excessive” was not defined).
30. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No.
98-1121, at 18 (1984).
31. Id.; see also Carbone, supra note 8, at 529.
32. Carbone, supra note 8, at 530.
33. Id. at 531 (citing PA. CONST. art. XVI, § 28); Duker, supra note 1, at
80.
34. Carbone, supra note 8, at 532; H.R. REP. No. 98-1121, at 19; see also
Duker, supra note 1, at 80-82 (providing a detailed discussion of the
individual colonies’ bail statutes).
35. Carbone, supra note 8, at 540-43.
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effective proxies for the risk of flight—where conviction
appeared more likely, the presumption that the accused would
flee was stronger.
In the early twentieth century, however, courts began to
additionally consider the defendant’s criminal record when
setting the amount of bail.36 In 1946, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure formalized this practice by adopting a
provision requiring consideration of the defendant’s criminal
record.37 Thus, consideration of the character and criminal
record of the defendant, the likelihood of conviction, and the
severity of the offense, determined whether he was to be
released on bail and if so, in what amount.38
In contrast to many state constitutions, the Constitution of
the United States does not guarantee the right to bail.39 The
Eighth Amendment provides only that “Excessive bail shall not
be required.”40 Although not constitutionally guaranteed, bail
protects the interests of the public and the interests of the
defendant “if the government can be assured of [the
defendant’s] presence” in court.41 The mandate that “a person
accused of crime shall not, until he has been finally adjudged
guilty in the court of last resort, be absolutely compelled to
undergo imprisonment or punishment”42 reinforces the
presumption of innocence.43
The right to bail in non-capital cases is preserved in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, however, which provides that:
[U]pon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be
admitted, except where the punishment may be
36. Id. at 546.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 547-48. The courts retained substantial discretion in the
decision to grant or deny bail based on the character of the defendant and his
criminal record. See Duker, supra note 1, at 69.
39. Carbone, supra note 8, at 533.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
41. United States v. Barber, 140 U.S. 164, 167 (1891).
42. Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895).
43. Duker, supra note 1, at 68 (“This traditional theory, corollary to the
notion of presumption of innocence, theoretically permits the accused to aid
his counsel in the preparation of a defense.”).
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death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but
by the Supreme or a circuit court, or by a justice
of the Supreme Court, or a judge of the district
court, who shall exercise their discretion therein,
regarding the nature and circumstances of the
offense, and of evidence, and the usages of law.44
Whether or not this language actually guarantees the right
to bail is still debated.45 In Stack v. Boyle,46 the Supreme Court
wrote:
[The] traditional right to freedom before
conviction permits the unhampered preparation
of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction
of punishment prior to conviction. . . . Unless this
right to bail before trial is preserved, the
presumption of innocence, secured only after
centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.47
Later in that same term, however, the Court also wrote in
dicta that:
The [Eighth Amendment’s] bail clause was lifted
with slight changes from the English Bill of
Rights Act. In England that clause has never
been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases,
but merely to provide that bail shall not be
excessive in those cases in which it is proper to
44. Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, § 33, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
45. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO.
98-1121, at 19 (1984); see also United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1326
(D.C. 1981) (“The history of the Eighth Amendment . . . is generally
unilluminating and falls short of supporting, let alone compelling, the
conclusion that a right to bail must be found by implication.”).
46. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
47. Id. at 4 (citation omitted). The question before the Court concerned
whether bail set at fifty thousand dollars for defendants accused of violating
the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.), was “excessive.” The Court held that “[b]ail set at a figure
higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill [the] purpose [of
assuring appearance at trial] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.”
Stack, 342 U.S. at 5; see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 20.
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grant bail. When this clause was carried over
into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that
indicated any different concept. The Eighth
Amendment has not prevented Congress from
defining the classes of cases in which bail shall
be allowed in this country. Thus in criminal
cases bail is not compulsory where the
punishment may be death. Indeed, the very
language of the Amendment fails to say all
arrests must be bailable.48
If bail is granted, however, the Eighth Amendment’s
guarantee that bail shall not be “excessive” applies. Despite the
longstanding prohibition on imposing excessive bail, the
question of what was excessive was not always understood to
refer to the monetary amount of bond imposed.49 In the colonial
period, the financial circumstances of the accused were not
considered when bail was set.50 Indeed, the state courts
considered that the imposition of bail calculated according to
the accused’s ability to pay would be unjust.51
In 1835, the District Court of the District of Columbia
redefined the concept of “excessive” bail, holding that:
[T]o require larger bail than the prisoner could
give would be to require excessive bail and to
deny bail in a case clearly bailable by law. . . .
[T]he discretion of the magistrate in taking bail
in a criminal case, is to be guided by the
compound consideration of the ability of the
prisoner to give bail, and the atrocity of the
offence.52
48. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-46 (1952). The Court limited
its holding to deportation cases but found that aliens being deported could be
held without bail. Id.; see also Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1330 (“Lower courts
have relied, alternatively, on the dicta of both Carlson and Stack to find or
deny a constitutional right to bail, but without any convincing resolution.”).
49. See Carbone, supra note 8, at 548-49.
50. Id. at 548.
51. Id. at 549 (quoting People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1820)).
52. Carbone, supra note 8, at 549 (citing United States v. Lawrence, 26
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Still, before the Bail Reform Act of 1966 (the “1966 Act”),
the gravity of the charged offense was the most important
consideration for the court and the defendant’s financial
circumstances were considered “only within limits dictated by
the seriousness of the offense.”53
C. The Bail Reform Act of 1966
During the decade preceding the enactment of the 1966
Act, studies by Caleb Foote54 and others55 demonstrated that
courts were rarely influenced by the defendant’s financial
resources in setting the amount of bail and that many
defendants remained in pretrial detention because they were
unable to post bond.56 In response, the Manhattan Bail Project
at the Vera Institute of Justice57 attempted to create an
alternative mechanism for determining which defendants
should be detained before trial, working from the premise that
the risk of flight was the sole rationale for a denial of bail. 58
The Manhattan Bail Project’s analysis of individual defendants’
ties to the community successfully halved the number of
individuals released on their own recognizance (i.e., with no
monetary bond) who subsequently failed to appear for trial.59
In response, Congress passed the 1966 Act, which “codified
a presumption in favor of pretrial release, prescribed nonmonetary conditions of release as an alternative to bail bonds,
and added ‘community ties’ as a new element to be weighed in
setting the conditions of release.”60 Under the 1966 Act, all
defendants other than those facing a potential capital sentence
were entitled to be released on their own recognizance unless
F. Cas. 887, 888 (C.C.D.D.C. 1835) (No. 15,577)).
53. Carbone, supra note 8, at 552.
54. See CALEB C. FOOTE, STUDIES ON BAIL 190 (1966).
55. See Carbone, supra note 8, at 552 nn.178-79.
56. Id. at 552.
57. See VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PROGRAMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: VERA
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE TEN-YEAR REPORT, 1961-1972 (1972).
58. Carbone, supra note 8, at 552-53.
59. Id. at 553.
60. Id. (citing Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3146(b), 80
Stat. 214 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (2006)).
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the court determined that the release “[would] not reasonably
assure” the defendant’s presence at trial.61 If the court found
that release on recognizance would not assure the defendant’s
appearance as required, the 1966 Act provided a series of
conditions that could be imposed, including:
[P]lacing the person in the custody of a
designated person or organization which agrees
to the supervision; restrictions on travel,
association and/or residence; execution of a bail
bond with a sufficient number of solvent sureties;
and finally the imposition of any other condition
deemed reasonably to assure appearance as
required, including a condition requiring that the
person return to custody after specified hours.62
In making the determination of what conditions were
reasonably necessary to assure the defendant’s appearance as
required, courts employed the Manhattan Bail Project’s
criteria, as well as the more “traditional” criteria of the weight
of evidence against the accused and his criminal history.63
Thus, until 1984, the “gravity of the offense” established the
contours of the decision to grant or deny bail and provided a
framework for a determination of the amount of bail that

61. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO.
98-1121, at 21 (1984). This and similar citations in this section refer to the
Bail Reform Act of 1966. The referenced provisions of the U.S. Code have
been amended by the Bail Reform Act of 1984. Defendants facing capital
charges were eligible for release on the same conditions “unless the judicial
officer has reason to believe that no such condition(s) will reasonably assure
that a particular defendant will not flee or pose a danger to any other person
or to the community.” Id. at 21-22.
62. Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). In 1982, the 1966 Act
was amended by the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, which added
the possibility of pretrial release on the condition that a defendant did not
violate federal obstruction of justice statutes. Id. at 22.
63. Id. at 21. These “traditional” criteria included, “the nature and
circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against the
accused, the accused’s family ties, employment, financial resources, character
and mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his
record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of
flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings.” Id.
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courts considered reasonable.64
D. The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970
Under the United States Constitution,65 Congress has
legislative jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. In the
1960s, following the enactment of the federal 1966 Act,
Congress reworked the District of Columbia Code, authorizing
preventive pretrial detention in noncapital cases on grounds
either that the accused was likely to pose a danger to the
community or a risk of flight for the first time.66 Pretrial
detention was authorized for individuals charged with:
[C]ertain defined dangerous crimes who could be
a threat to the safety of the community; (2) those
charged with a crime of violence who have been
convicted of such a crime within the immediate
preceding ten year period, or those who were on
bail or other release pending completion of a
sentence; and (3) those charged with any offense
who, for the purpose of obstructing or attempting
to obstruct justice, threaten, injure, intimidate or
attempt to threaten injure or intimidate any
prospective witness or juror.67
The law also provided for a detention hearing procedure at
which the judicial officer was instructed to release the
individual on bail unless the officer found by clear and
convincing evidence that he fell into one of the enumerated
categories; that “there [was] no condition or combination of
conditions or release which [would] reasonably assure the
safety of any other persons or the community,” taking various
factors into consideration; and “with the exception of those in
the third category, supra, that there [was] a substantial
64.
65.
66.
67.

Carbone, supra note 8, at 541.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 22.
Id.
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probability that the accused committed the offense for which he
[was] present before the judicial officer.”68
The Code’s preventive detention measure was challenged,
but ultimately upheld by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, which reasoned that the provision
was regulatory, not punitive, because it “was not intended to
promote either of the ‘traditional aims of punishment
retribution and deterrence.’”69 The preventive detention
provision and other sections of the District of Columbia Code,
regarding the admissibility of evidence at the detention
hearing and the representation by counsel, formed the
background against which Congress deliberated when
reforming the 1966 Act.
II. The Bail Reform Act of 1984
Following the enactment of the 1966 Act, it became clear
that the risk of flight alone was an inadequate ground on which
to base the bail decision. Moreover, when Congress was
debating enactment of the 1984 reforms, Representative
Kastenmeier noted in his report to the House Judiciary
Committee that, since passage of the 1966 Act, the judiciary
had adopted a de facto consideration of dangerousness “by
denominating defendants as flight risks and setting a high bail.
. . . One study estimate[d] that about two-thirds of those
eligible for detention under the Senate bail bill [that became
the 1984 Act] [were] already detained.”70 Thus, federal courts
were taking matters into their own hands, effectively denying
bail in cases where they deemed defendants to be dangerous by
setting inordinately high bail, albeit on stated grounds of risk
of flight.
In the spring of 1982, President Reagan began pressing for
congressional action on a number of anticrime proposals
including bail reform. He urged Congress to “set an example for
the States by establishing a modern, effective criminal justice

68. Id.
69. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1332-33 (D.C. 1981)
(quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
70. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 10-11.
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system,” by passing proposed legislation that would include
“reform of our bail laws so that a judge, after a hearing with
full due process protections, can prevent a dangerous defendant
from returning to the streets to prey once again on innocent
citizens. It would permit a judge to set reasonable conditions
for pretrial release and to lock up any defendant who is
rearrested while out on bail.”71
A. President Reagan’s Anticrime Proposals
Congressional work on the law that would become the 1984
Act began when President Reagan’s Attorney General’s task
force on crime and the Senate Judiciary Committee developed
an omnibus anticrime bill and sent it to Congress for
consideration in 1982.72 Thereafter, however, the proposals
were not immediately taken up, and, on February 18, 1984,
President Reagan addressed the nation, urging Congress to
act.73 In his address, the President argued that “too many of
our friends and loved ones live in fear of crime. . . . For too
many years, the scales of criminal justice were tilted toward
protecting rights of criminals. . . . The liberal approach of
coddling criminals didn’t work and never will.”74 Describing the
bail reforms, the President said:
It’s hard to imagine the present system being
any worse. Except in capital cases, Federal
courts cannot consider the danger a defendant
may pose to others if released. The judge can
only consider whether it’s likely the defendant
will appear for trial if granted bail. Recently, a
man charged with armed robbery and suspected
71. President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Proposed Anticrime
Legislation
(May
26,
1982),
available
at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/52682b.htm.
72. See President Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Reporters Announcing
Proposed Criminal Justice Reform Legislation (Sept. 13, 1982), available at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/91382b.htm.
73. See President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on
Proposed
Crime
Legislation
(Feb.
18,
1984),
available
at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/21884a.htm.
74. Id.
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of four others was given a low bond and quickly
released. Four days later he and a companion
robbed a bank, and in the course of the robbery a
policeman was shot. This kind of outrage
happens again and again, and it must be
stopped. So, we want to permit judges to deny
bail and lock up defendants who the government
has shown pose a grave danger to their
communities.75
The President’s inflammatory example, which implied that
an arrest could be a proxy for guilt, reflected the deep
dissatisfaction with the 1966 Act’s reliance on risk of flight and
preyed on increasing fears of criminal activity within American
communities.76
B. Congressional Debates and Legislative Enactment
Based on experience with the 1966 Act and in reaction to
the public’s perception that crime was increasing across
America, Congress’s overwhelming rationale for the 1984 Act
was the desire to increase judicial discretion to detain
individuals based on a perceived danger to the community.77 As
75. Id.
76. In a speech on the floor of the House in August 1984, Representative
Lungren admonished his colleagues for having ignored the President’s
anticrime proposals for fifty-one weeks, and cited a report in USA TODAY that
sixty-two percent of readers described themselves as “very worried” about
crime, while only fifty-two percent described themselves as “very worried”
about nuclear war. 130 CONG. REC. H23,592-93 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Lungren). Similarly, Representative Hoyer cited statistics
from a U.S. Department of Justice report from September 1983 that in 1982,
“there was one murder every [twenty-five] minutes, one rape every [seven]
minutes, one robbery every [fifty-nine] seconds, and one burglary every [nine]
seconds.” 130 CONG. REC. H10,807 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Hoyer).
77. S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3185, 1983 WL 25404, at *3:
Many of the changes in the Bail Reform Act incorporated in
this bill reflect the Committee’s determination that federal
bail laws must address the alarming problem of crimes
committed by persons on release and must give the courts
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Representative Kastenmeier wrote:
In 1966, the Congress made an explicit decision
not to permit the courts to assess directly
whether the defendant was dangerous. . . . Since
1966, there has been continued pressure for the
use of pretrial detention based on predictions of
dangerousness. During this [fifteen]-year period,
some additional evidence has emerged which
may help resolve the issues outlined above. The
pressure for preventive detention has produced
changes in the bail laws in a number of states
and passage of a bail reform bill by the Senate.78
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary agreed, reporting
that “[c]onsiderable criticism has been leveled at the Bail
Reform Act [of 1966] in the years since its enactment because
of its failure to recognize the problem of crimes committed by
those on pretrial release.”79
During the period leading to the enactment of the 1984
Act, the House Committee on the Judiciary held three days of
hearings on bail reform, seeking to establish through expert
testimony from the Judicial Conference of the United States,
the Pretrial Resource Center, the Reagan Administration, the
American Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties Union,
and academic experts, the “nature and extent of pretrial crime
in the Federal criminal justice system,” and which of the
proposed legislative measures would be most effective, least
costly (both financially and humanly), and would pose the
fewest constitutional problems.80

adequate authority to make release decisions that give
appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to
others if released.
Id.
78. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT
98-1121, at 10 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
79. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 5.
80. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 9.
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In his written report to the House Judiciary Committee
summarizing the hearings, Representative Kastenmeier
characterized the “question of whether dangerousness should
be a sufficient justification for pretrial detention” as “the single
most difficult bail issue.”81 He presciently noted, inter alia, that
opponents of preventive pretrial detention found that
“predictive pretrial detention should be minimized because of
the negative impact detention has on trial outcome and
sentence (all other things being equal, detainees are more
likely to be convicted and, once convicted, receive longer
sentences).”82
When the legislation containing the 1984 Act came to the
House floor for debate, Representative Kastenmeier spoke
against the bail reform provisions as written, saying, “Title I of
this bill radically changes bail practices in this country by
authorizing preventive detention. While I recognize that fear of
crime and the public concern about crimes committed on
pretrial release motivate these provisions, these changes are
ill-founded and possibly unconstitutional.”83 Specifically, he
argued that the bill “may violate the eighth amendment right
to bail. Second, the bill may violate the due process
requirements of the fifth amendment.”84
Representative Kastenmeier’s view gained support from
Representative Rodino, who agreed that allowing pretrial
detention based on predictions of dangerousness went “too
far,”85 and from Representative Conyers, who said that,
“[w]hen we authorize preventive detention in an
unconstitutional way to permit the Federal courts to lock up a
person without a finding of guilt based on the judge’s guess
about the person’s future behavior, I think we have a
constitutional problem.”86 Nonetheless, the House passed the
measure, which Representative Sawyer called “one tremendous
81. Id. at 11.
82. 130 CONG. REC. H10,811 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Robert Kastenmeier).
83. Id.
84. Id. at n.1.
85. 130 CONG. REC. H10,810 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Peter Rodino).
86. 130 CONG. REC. H10,813 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep.
John Conyers).
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crime bill . . . [and] the biggest crime bill ever passed in
history.”87
In the Senate, the rhetoric was much more favorable. The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s report noted the “deep
public concern, which the Committee shares, about the growing
problem of crimes committed by persons on release.”88 The
Committed cited a report that one out of every six defendants
released pretrial was rearrested during the pretrial period, and
one third of those were rearrested more than once.89 Thus, the
Committee wrote:
[T]here is a small but identifiable group of
particularly dangerous defendants as to whom
neither the imposition of stringent release
conditions nor the prospect of revocation of
release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or other persons. It is with respect to
this limited group of offenders that the courts
must be given the power to deny release pending
trial.90
On October 4, 1984, the Senate adopted the Thurmond
Amendment No. 7043, which included a number of major
amendments to federal criminal law including “bail and
sentencing reform, forfeiture of drug assets, improvements in
the insanity defense, increased drug penalties, surplus Federal
property improvements, labor racketeering provisions, prison
construction assistance, missing children provisions, Federal
assistance to state crime victim compensation programs, and
trademark counterfeiting, credit card fraud, armed career
criminals and terrorism provisions.”91 In his remarks, Senator
Thurmond noted that:

87. 130 CONG. REC. H11,981 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Thomas Sawyer); 130 CONG. REC. H11,981 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (statement
of Rep. Neal Smith).
88. S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3188, 1983 WL 25404, at *6.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 6-7.
91. H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong. (1984) (enacted).

19

MERINGOLOMACRO 50 PAGES

2012]

11/13/2012 9:08 AM

BAIL PENDING TRIAL

819

[T]he crime problem is a high priority for the
American people and, thus, should receive
prompt and effective attention on the part of
their elective representatives. The crime package
that we are offering today is a result of many
years of hard work and dedication on the part of
Members of Congress and individuals in the
executive branch. Let me emphasize to my
colleagues on both sides of the Capitol dome-this
is a bipartisan effort that cuts across liberal and
conservative lines.”92
In concurrence, Senator Biden called the bill a bipartisan
effort, and noted that earlier versions of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984 had been passed by overwhelming
majorities in both the House and the Senate, stating that “[t]he
enactment of this crime legislation should not be a partisan
issue. Crime is not a Democratic issue or a Republican issue.” 93
Senator Laxalt praised the legislation, saying:
The reforms made by this legislation are wellconsidered responses to a serious crime problem
in our Nation. When this package is signed into
law, criminals who are found to be dangerous
will no longer be free on bail to walk to streets
and commit other crimes . . . . [S]uffice it to say
that all of the reforms are essential to reshape
our Federal criminal justice system. These
changes will go a long way toward making this
system one which is truly just.”94
Senator Kennedy called the bail reform provisions of the
Act, “historic . . . far reaching, and . . . urgently needed.” He
continued:
92. 130 CONG. REC. S13,062 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Strom Thurmond).
93. 130 CONG. REC. S13,063 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Joseph Biden).
94. 130 CONG. REC. S13,078 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Paul Laxalt).
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The most important provision is the change that
at last permits judges to take into account the
potential dangerousness of defendants in
deciding whether they should be released on bail.
No longer will judges be faced with the Hobson’s
choice of granting bail to a demonstrably
dangerous defendant, or subverting the law with
a baseless finding that the defendant is likely to
flee. No longer will any judge feel compelled by a
foolish law to release a dangerous defendant into
a community to rape or rob or mug or kill again.
There are also important companion changes in
the existing law on money bail. The act prohibits
the use of money bail as a means to assure a
defendant’s appearance at trial, and limits the
amount of bail to the defendant’s ability to pay.
No longer will rich defendants be released
because they can afford to post their bail, while
the poor remain in jail.
****
In sum, this legislation embodies a unique
national consensus that more can be done and
must be done to combat crime in our society. The
bill we offer today is a giant step forward for the
safety of our communities, for the preservation of
our freedoms, and for every law enforcement
officer, every criminal justice official, and every
citizen in America.95
Senator Leahy noted that, “[o]ur bail laws, both Federal
and State, have failed to give adequate consideration to how
much danger is posed to the community by particular bail
conditions. This bill allows a judge to evaluate a danger to the

95. 130 CONG. REC. S13,079 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Edward Kennedy).

21

MERINGOLOMACRO 50 PAGES

2012]

11/13/2012 9:08 AM

BAIL PENDING TRIAL

821

community. It is a change that is long overdue.”96 He
cautioned, however, that “the strengthening of our Federal bail
law implies a strong duty to ensure a speedy trial. . . . Judges
should embrace the bail standards in this bill, but should use
their considerable powers to see to it that those who are denied
bail because of danger to the society are promptly tried. . . .
Curbs on bail are curbs on the personal liberty of the accused.
The need for bail is deeply rooted in the presumption of
innocence.”97
Despite evidence that the proportion of federal defendants
released on bail and rearrested for subsequent criminal activity
was very low,98 Congress’s stated rationale—to protect the
public—was adopted and accepted by the Supreme Court in the
first case to challenge the constitutionality of the 1984 Act’s
preventive detention provisions.99

96. 130 CONG. REC. S13,088 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Patrick Leahy).
97. Id.
98. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. 981121, at 11 (1984) (“At the Federal level, in 10 demonstration districts [using
expanded pretrial supervision], the pretrial arrest rate for releasees was
reduced to 4.7% and only 2.4% are charged with a new felony”).
An early study done by the Harvard Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties Law review found that if the criteria of the D.C.
preventive detention statute were applied in Boston, for
every correct prediction (i.e. an incarceration of the person
would have prevented the offense) seven persons would
have been incorrectly jailed, thus, tripling the detention
population. Two more recent studies (one national and one
of the District of Columbia) indicate that using the best
available predictive device would result in at least as many
incorrect predictions as correct ones. Moreover, the national
study found that a 16% reduction in pretrial crime would
result in an increase of 30% in the detention population.
The most recent study using Federal data found that 93%
eligible for detention would, if released, not commit a new
offense. Thus, finding the dangerous 7% is a formidable
task.
Id. at n.11.
99. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987).
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C. Pretrial Detention for Dangerousness or Risk of Flight
Under the 1984 Act
Pursuant to the 1984 Act,100 the court “shall order the
pretrial release of [a defendant] on personal recognizance, or
upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond . . . unless the
[court] determines that such release will not reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the
safety of any other person or the community.”101
If the court determines that release on personal
recognizance or unsecured bond poses a risk of nonappearance
or of danger to the community, the court “shall order the
pretrial release of the person . . . subject to the least restrictive
. . . condition, or combination of conditions, that . . . will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required
and the safety of any other person and the community . . . .”102
Only if the court finds after a hearing that “no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any
other person and the community” shall the court detain the
defendant pending trial.103 A finding that no conditions will
reasonably assure “the safety of any other person and the
community” must be supported by clear and convincing
100. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006).
101. Id. § 3142(b).
102. Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B). The specific conditions, which are enumerated in
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i)-(xiv), include release to custody of a designated
person who will assure the defendant’s appearance; that the defendant
maintain or seek employment; maintain or seek education; abide by specific
restrictions on personal associations, place of abode, or travel; avoid all
contact with alleged victims and potential witnesses; report regularly to
pretrial services; comply with an imposed curfew; refrain from possession of a
firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon; refrain from
excessive use of alcohol or any use of narcotic drugs without a prescription;
undergo medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment as mandated; agree
to forfeiture of property or money for failure to appear as required; execute a
bail bond with sufficient sureties to reasonably assure the court of
appearance; return to custody for specified hours following release for
employment, education, or other limited purposes; and satisfy “any other
condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person
as required and to assure the safety of any other person and the community.
Id.
103. Id. § 3142(e)(1).
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evidence.104 A finding that the defendant poses a risk of flight
must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.105 The
burden of proof rests with the government.
If a defendant is accused of
(A) a crime of violence, [sex trafficking of
children], or [an act of terrorism transcending
national boundaries] . . . for which a maximum
term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is
prescribed; (B) an offense for which the
maximum sentence is life imprisonment or
death; (C) a[] [controlled substances] offense for
which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten
years or more is prescribed . . .[,]106
or if the defendant is accused of any felony and has
previously been convicted of two or more such offenses in
federal or state courts,107 or if the case involves “any felony that
is not otherwise a crime of violence that involves a minor
victim or that involves the possession or use of a firearm or
destructive device . . . or any other dangerous weapon . . . [,]” 108
a rebuttable presumption arises that “no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of
any other person and the community.”109
In deciding “whether there are conditions of release that
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required and the safety of any other person and the
community[,]” the 1984 Act instructs the court to consider:
(1) [T]he nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, including whether the offense is a crime
of violence . . . or involves a . . . firearm,
explosive, or destructive device; (2) the weight of
the evidence against the person; (3) the history
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5

Id. § 3142(f)(2)(B).
United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985).
18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(1)(A)-(C) (citations omitted).
Id. § 3142(f)(1)(D).
Id. § 3142(f)(1)(E).
Id. § 3142(e)(2).
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and characteristics of the person . . . ; and . . . (4)
the nature and seriousness of the danger to any
person or the community that would be posed by
the person’s release.110
Because the 1984 Act favors pretrial release, “it is only a
limited group of offenders who should be denied bail pending
trial.”111
D. The Supreme Court’s Constitutional Analysis of the 1984
Act
In 1987, the Supreme Court considered the preventive
detention provisions of the 1984 Act and found them
constitutional in United States v. Salerno.112 Anthony Salerno
and Vincent Cafaro were charged in a twenty-nine-count
indictment that alleged, inter alia, thirty-five acts of
racketeering activity including conspiracy to commit murder.
Salerno was alleged to be the “boss” of the Genovese crime
family, and Cafaro was alleged to be a “captain” in the same
family.113 The government moved for detention, proffering
evidence obtained through wiretaps and offering the testimony
of two of its trial witnesses.114 In return, Salerno offered
testimony from character witnesses and medical evidence in
the form of a letter from his doctor. Both Salerno and Cafaro
challenged the reliability of the government’s evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses.115
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted the government’s detention motion, concluding that
the 1984 Act’s requirements had been met and that “the
Government had established by clear and convincing evidence
that no condition or combination of conditions of release would
110. Id. § 3142(g).
111. United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 195
(2d Cir. 1987)).
112. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
113. Id. at 743.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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ensure the safety of the community or any person”116 because:
The activities of a criminal organization such as
the Genovese Family do not cease with the arrest
of its principals and their release on even the
most stringent of bail conditions. . . . When
business as usual involves threats, beatings, and
murder, the present danger such people pose in
the community is self-evident.117
The defendants appealed the detention order, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed
that, “to the extent that the Bail Reform Act permits pretrial
detention on the ground that the arrestee is likely to commit
future crimes, it is unconstitutional on its face.”118 The Second
Circuit reasoned that “our criminal law system holds persons
accountable for past actions, not anticipated future actions [,]”
and that “the Government could not, consistent with due
process, detain persons who had not been accused of any crime
merely because they were thought to present a danger to the
community.”119
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in a six-tothree decision and found the 1984 Act’s preventive detention
provisions constitutional.120 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
for the Court began by noting that the 1984 Act had been
enacted in response to “the alarming problem of crimes
committed by persons on release.”121 On that basis, the Court
held that the 1984 Act did not violate the Due Process Clause
either
substantively
or
procedurally.122
The
Court
characterized the preventive detention provision as “regulatory
in nature” and found that it did “not constitute punishment
116. Id. at 743-44.
117. Id. at 744 (citing United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1375
(S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
118. Id. (referencing United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.
1986)).
119. Id. at 744-45.
120. Id. at 740.
121. Id. at 742 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3185, 1983 WL 25404, at *3).
122. Id. at 746-52.
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before trial in violation of the Due Process Clause.”123 Praising
Congress’s “careful delineation of the circumstances under
which detention will be permitted,” the Court wrote, “When the
Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an
arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an
individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with
the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from
executing that threat.”124
The Court also found that the 1984 Act did not violate the
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause.125 Referencing its
earlier decisions in Stack v. Boyle126 and Carlson v. Landon,127
the Court held that, “when Congress has mandated detention
on the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of
flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does not require
release on bail.”128
Thus, since the Court’s holding in Salerno, federal district
courts are authorized to order the pretrial detention of
defendants based on a perceived risk of flight, or a danger to
the community. The following sections of this Article examine
how the 1984 Act’s detention provisions affect the ability of
criminal defense attorneys to defend their clients and how
pretrial detention imperils defendants’ exercise of their
constitutional rights.
III. The 1984 Act in Practice—Defense Attorneys’
Perspectives
The 1984 Act’s authorization of preventive pretrial
detention has had a profound impact on the ability of defense
attorneys to defend their clients and on the defendants’
abilities to exercise their constitutional rights.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 748.
Id. at 751.
Id. at 752-55.
342 U.S. 1 (1951).
342 U.S. 524 (1952).
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754-55.
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A. The Detention Hearing
Under the 1984 Act, after a defendant is arrested, a
detention hearing is held at which the court attempts to
determine the “risk of flight” or “danger to the community”
posed by the defendant. After the detention hearing, a
defendant is either released on bail or remanded for the
pretrial period.129 The detention hearing is held at the
defendant’s first appearance before the court130—usually in
front of a magistrate judge—unless either party seeks a
continuance.
The 1984 Act favors pretrial release.131 Nonetheless, the
issue of detention has become closely litigated, especially in
cases where a defendant has a prior criminal record or
substantial ties to a foreign country. In addition, because of the
increasing number of narcotics cases, a growing number of
defendants fall within the rebuttable presumption of the 1984
Act,132 so that even first time offenders often struggle to gain
pretrial release.
The detention hearing can provide an insight into the
government’s case and present a strategic opportunity as well.
Andrew Weinstein133 explains:
129. See, e.g., Krista Ward & Todd R. Wright, Pretrial Detention Based
Solely on Community Danger: A Practical Dilemma, 1999 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2,
I.2 (1999) (calling into question whether a detention hearing based on danger
to the community alone is authorized by the 1984 Act).
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(f) (2006).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a); see United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75
(2d Cir. 2007) (finding that even if the government establishes, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant presents a flight risk, the
government must also demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
no conditions could be imposed on the defendant that would reasonably
assure his attendance in court. The operative standard is “reasonable
assurances” not conditions that guarantee attendance); see also United States
v. Tomero, 169 F. App'x 639, 641 (2d Cir. 2006).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1).
133. Mr. Weinstein received a B.A. from the University of Michigan in
1987 and graduated, magna cum laude, from Cardozo School of Law in 1990.
Following his graduation from Cardozo, Mr. Weinstein served as a law clerk
to the Hon. Charles H. Tenney, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of New York. Between 1991 and 1998, Mr. Weinstein was associated
with LaRossa, Mitchell, and Ross, a boutique criminal defense firm in New
York City where he participated in many high-profile criminal trials. Mr.
Weinstein is the founder of The Weinstein Law Firm PLLC in New York City
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In one case I was involved in, the prosecution
sought an order of detention based upon an
extensive proffer that relied, in part, upon
evidence obtained derivatively from certain Title
III intercepted communications. The defense
maintained, successfully, that in light of the
information contained within the government’s
proffer, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) required that the
government turn over to the defense the court
orders and accompanying applications for the
underlying T III intercepted communications.
The government had apparently not considered
the disclosure provisions of § 2518(9) and there
were tactical reasons why the government did
not want to disclose these documents to the
defense. Ultimately, the government had to turn
over the orders and affidavits and they proved to
contain significant helpful information, including
the identification of potential witnesses, that was
critically important and valuable in connection
with the preparation of the defense. Absent, the
vigorous litigation which took place at the
detention hearing stage, these orders and
applications likely would have never been
obtained by the defense, particularly given the
government’s position that they did not intend to
introduce any of the resulting recordings at
trial.134
1. Risk of Flight and the Law of Return
Historically,
likelihood that a
subsequent court
Section I, above,

the risk of flight revolved around the
defendant would not appear as required at
proceedings, including trial. As set forth in
early bail laws sought to enlist suretors or

where he continues to represent individual and corporate clients in a wide
array of criminal investigations and in all stages of complex criminal and
civil litigation in federal and New York state courts.
134. Letter from Andrew Weinstein to authors (Jan. 31, 2012) (on file
with authors).
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require monetary bonds to guarantee a defendant’s
appearance.135 Following the Vera Institute of Justice’s
Manhattan Bail Project, the defendant’s community ties
became increasingly important to the bail determination.
Today, defense attorneys attempt to assess the nature and
quality of a defendant’s ties to the community, including the
number of family members in the local area, a defendant’s
work situation, and, conversely, any ties that the defendant or
his family have to any other state or foreign jurisdiction, in
order to demonstrate to the court that a defendant can be
relied upon to appear as required. Martin Geduldig136 notes
that, “The most common reason for a defendant to be denied
bail is the crime charged—homicide, drugs. Another very
common reason is the country of origin of a defendant—
whether he is a citizen or not. A naturalized citizen with
contacts abroad is viewed with skepticism.”137
Recently, the government has advanced the proposition
that individual defendants with ties to Israel present an
additional risk of flight given Israel’s Law of Return,138 which
provides that every Jew has the right to come to Israel and to
claim Israeli citizenship. Although Israel allows extradition to
the United States,139 the argument is nonetheless often made
that a defendant who is Jewish presents a prima facie risk of
flight. As has been argued, if this means that anyone to whom
the Law of Return applies is an increased flight risk, then
“every Jew” would have to be viewed for bail purposes as a
greater risk of flight than a non-Jew. “That means at least
135. See United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1988)
(finding that simply being charged with a crime, conviction of which carries a
potential sentence of incarceration, does not create a presumption of a risk of
flight for the purposes of the 1984 Act).
136. Mr. Geduldig is a Georgetown University Law Center graduate and
a former counsel to the New York State Senate Committee on Crime and
Correction. He is currently the Chairman of the Nassau County Bar
Association Committee on Criminal Procedure and Committee on Federal
Courts and is listed as one of the top ten criminal defense lawyers in Long
Island, New York.
137. Letter from Martin Geduldig to authors (Feb. 15, 2012) (on file with
authors).
138. The Law of Return, 5710-1950, SH No. 51 p. 189 (Isr.), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/return.htm.
139. United States v. Samet, 11 F. App'x 21, 22 (2d Cir. 2001).
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5,300,000 Americans would be viewed as heightened bail risks
simply because they are Jew[ish].”140 “[This] logic would [ ]
extend even to a Jew[ish] American whose family lived in this
country since the first Jews arrived on the shores of New
Amsterdam in 1654.”141 From a defense perspective, this
reading of the 1984 Act’s “risk of flight” provision is clearly
nonsensical.
Moreover, Israel and the United States have signed
extradition treaties142 providing that each country must
extradite its own nationals at the request of the other.143 In
2005, the Justice Department advised the Senate that from
1999 to 2005, “the United States has extradited a total of 20
fugitives from Israel, of whom 15 were Israeli nationals
(including dual United States-Israeli nationals).”144
For example, in 2002, Michael Akva, an Israeli
citizen, was extradited by Israel to the United
States on securities fraud and insider trading
charges. In 2000, Sharon Haroush, an Israeli
citizen, was extradited by Israel to the United
140. Memorandum of Law in Support of Sholom Rubashkin's Motion for
Reconsideration of His Pre-trial Detention at 6 United States v. Rubashkin,
718 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (No. 08-1324), 2008 WL 6458257
[hereinafter Rubashkin’s Motion]; see Mordecai Plaut, The Real State of
American Jewry, HAARETZ (Nov. 12, 2003), http://www.haaretz.com/news/thereal-state-of-american-jewry-1.105442.
141. Rubashkin’s Motion, supra note 140, at 13.
142. Convention on Extradition Between the Government of the State of
Israel and the Government of the United States of America, U.S.-Isr., Dec.
10, 1962, 14 U.S.T. 1707.
143. Id. at art. IV (“[a] requested Party shall not decline to extradite a
person sought because such person is a national of the requested Party.”).
144. Pending Treaties: Congressional Testimony Before Committee on
Senate Foreign Relations, at 7 (Nov. 15, 2005) (statement of Mary E. Warlow,
Director, Office of Int’l Affairs, Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice, S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations) [hereinafter Warlow Statement]; see Rubashkin’s Motion,
supra note 140, at 17 n.20 (“A limited exception [now] applies to persons who
were Israelis at the time of the offense. Such persons are still to be extradited
from Israel to the United States, but only on the condition that they be
returned to Israel to serve their sentences”). This condition of returning
Isrealis to Israel to serve their sentence was part of the pre-existing
procedure that the Justice Department found to be workable. Warlow
Statement, supra note 144; see also Extradition Law, 5714-1954, 8 LSI 144
(1953-1954)(Isr.).
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States on fraud and theft charges.145 [In 1977],
Chaim Berger, an American citizen from New
York . . . was indicted in the Southern District of
New York for defrauding the government of
many millions of dollars. He fled to Israel where
he had never lived previously, and claimed
citizenship under the Law of Return. He was
extradited back to the United States, pled guilty
and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment.146
In 2006, the Attorney General of the United
States publicly praised Israel for its extradition
to the United States of an Israeli who was a
suspected [organized crime] boss on drug charges
. . . . [D]espite the history of successful
extraditions, the Administration sought and
obtained Senate ratification for a protocol
amending
the
treaty
to
“significantly
streamline[]
the
process
of
requesting
extradition.” [T]he amended treaty now allows
the use of hearsay; streamline[s] the procedures
for ‘provisional arrest;’ expands the list of
extraditable offenses, providing that any crime
that constitutes an offense in both countries and
is punishable by imprisonment of one year or
more is extraditable; [and] requires that only one
offense need be extraditable—as long as there is
one extraditable offense in the United States’
extradition request, Israel can extradite on nonextraditable offenses as well.147
145. Rubashkin’s Motion, supra note 140, at 15 (citing SEC Obtains
Default Judgments Ordering Two Defendants to Pay $7.6 Million For Insider
Trading, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n Litigation Release No. 18193 (June 18,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18193.htm).
146. Id. at 15 n.14 (citing Randal C. Archibald, Israeli Court Allows
Return of Man Indicted in Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/07/nyregion/israeli-court-allows-return-ofman-indicted-in-fraud.html; United States v. Berger, 22 F. Supp. 2d 145
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)); see United States v. Berger, No. 97-Cr-00410-BSJ (S.D.N.Y.
May 23, 2002) (No. 167, Filed Judgment as to Defendant Chaim Berger).
147. Id. at 15-16 (citing U.S. Attorney General Praises Israel for Fight
Against Terror, International Crime, HAARETZ, June 27, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/u-s-attorney-general-praises-israel-for-fight-
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Not surprisingly, after the new Protocol was
signed, extraditions from Israel increased . . . .
For example, in September 2010 the United
States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District
of New York announced that Israel had arrested
nine Israelis in a lottery telemarketing fraud
scheme. According to the government’s press
release, “[t]his case involves the largest number
of Israeli citizens ever to be provisionally
arrested
by
Israel
in
anticipation
of
extradition.”148
Due to “the effectiveness of the treaty, the Law of Return
does not create an opportunity for successful flight from
prosecution.”149 And it therefore creates no motive to flee.
Should a defendant flee nonetheless, “to accelerate the
extradition procedure, some courts have required as a condition
of bail that defendants with strong ties to Israel (including
citizenship) execute irrevocable waivers of extradition.”150
In the Authors’ experience, defendants with ties to foreign
countries including Israel may be granted bail if they are able
to post a high bond. For example, in United States v.
Shereshevsky,151 Judge Lynch granted bail to a convicted felon
charged in an alleged two hundred and fifty million dollar
securities fraud action where the defendant had substantial
against-terror-1.191465; Warlow Statement, supra note 144, at 6-7; Israel
Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Isr., Dec. 10, 1962, art. II, IX, XI, 14 U.S.T. 1707).
148. Id. at 17 (citing Press Release, U.S. Attorney S. Dist. of N.Y., Isr.Based Defendants Indicted and Arrested in Lottery Telemarketing Fraud
Targeting
U.S.
Citizens
(Sept.
26,
2008),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/September08/mayoetalarrestindi
ctmentpr.pdf).
149. Id. at 18.
150. Id. (citing United States v. Shimon, No. 06-Cr-0210, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 52979 (D. Nev. July 27, 2006) (Israeli citizen released upon condition
of executing extradition waiver); United States v. Karni, 298 F. Supp. 2d 129,
133 (D.D.C. 2004) (same); United States v. Cohen, No. 00-Cr-00100 (S.D. Fla.
May 5, 2000); Order Requiring Written Waiver of Extradition, United States
v. Cohen, No. 00-Cr-00100 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2000), ECF No. 35; Order
Denying Request for Pretrial Detention, United States v. Cohen, No. 02-MJ02592 (S.D. Fla. May 3, 2002), ECF No. 16; Detention Hearing, United States
v. Freund, No. 99-Cr-00561 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 1999), ECF. No. 22).
151. No. 94-Cr-248 (CSH), 2003 WL 21497629 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003).
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international ties and business operations in Israel and Africa.
Some of the countries in Africa had no extradition treaties with
the United States. Letters written by rabbis and members of
the Orthodox Jewish community and incorporated into
counsel’s memorandum in favor of bail evidenced his
“substantial . . . family and community ties,”152 and Mr.
Shereshevsky was granted bail. Mr. Shereshevsky’s bail was
set at a ten million dollar personal recognizance bond cosigned
by ten financially responsible people, at least five of whom were
not related to him through blood or marriage, one million
dollars in property not owned by Mr. Shereshevsky, secured by
five thousand dollars cash from each cosigner, and home
confinement with electronic monitoring.153
In United States v. Ezagui,154 Magistrate Judge Go granted
bail even though Mr. Ezagui had been arrested at John F.
Kennedy Airport with a one-way ticket to South America, and
was a citizen of Israel where his wife and children resided. His
bail consisted of a three million dollar bond cosigned by his
brother and one additionally financially responsible surety,
secured by three properties owned by his brother and his
brother’s shares in a corporation, and home detention with
electronic monitoring.155 While on bail, Mr. Ezagui’s son was
injured during service with the Israeli army, and the court
granted him permission to visit his son in Israel. He spent
approximately two weeks there and returned without incident,
adhering to the court’s restrictions.

152. Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Release, United States v.
Shereshevsky, No. 94-Cr-248 (CSH), 2003 WL 21497629 (S.D.N.Y. June 25,
2003) (available through ECF, original on file with the authors).
153. Mr. Shereshevsky later was unable to meet the conditions, and
argued that the bail should be reduced. Shereshevsky relied on United States
v. Penaranda, No. 00-Cr-1251(RWS), 2001 WL 125621, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
13, 2001) (“[W]here a defendant cannot meet the financial conditions of his
bail, then the court should consider where that particular financial condition
is a necessary part of the bail conditions to provide reasonable assurance of
the defendant’s appearance, and set forth written findings of fact and legal
conclusions regarding that issue”).
154. 08-MJ-00530 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2008).
155. John Marzulli & William Sherman, Brooklyn Developer Eliyahu
Ezagui Indicted in $18M Mortgage Fraud, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 2, 2009,
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-04-02/local/17920261_1_mortgagefraud-indictment-buyers.
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2. Danger to the Community
Since the enactment of the 1984 Act, a defendant’s
perceived danger to the community has become a frequently
contested basis for pretrial detention. Although not defined in
the 1984 Act, “danger” is understood to mean “the likelihood
that the accused will engage in criminal activity, including
non-violent criminal activity, if released.”156 As Andrew
Weinstein notes:
Putting aside those crimes with presumptions in
favor of detention, the seriousness of the crime a
defendant is charged with, whether it is a crime
of violence, how much prison time the defendant
is facing upon conviction, whether the defendant
is alleged to be part of a criminal organization
(such as in a RICO or CCE prosecution), and if
so, what his or her position is within such
organization, are all factors that typically play
into a court’s decision whether to release a
defendant on bail.
****
Typically, the defendant’s prior history plays a
significant role in advancing arguments in favor
of bail pending trial. Regardless of the
prosecution’s arguments in favor of detention
and/or the nature of the crime charged, the
defendant’s prior history is usually a good source
of information to refute such arguments. For
example, if the defendant has no prior criminal
history, one could argue that as a factor weighing
heavily in favor of release on bail. Conversely, if
the defendant has an extensive and long156. Michael Harwin, Note, Detaining for Danger Under the Bail Reform
Act of 1984: Paradoxes of Procedure and Proof, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1091, 1091
(1993).
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standing criminal history, that too could be a
factor that one can argue should weigh heavily in
favor of release. For example, if the defendant’s
history is replete with prior arrests and
convictions, but no criminal activity while the
defendant was out on bail in any other case and
no prior instance of bail jumping, one could take
the long criminal history of his or her client and
turn it into a positive by arguing that the Court
need not speculate as to whether the defendant
would commit crimes and/or come back to court if
released on bail (like the Court would with
someone without any criminal history) since,
despite the defendant’s long and extensive
criminal history, he/she has never once been
charged with committing a crime while on
release or with failing to come to court when
required.157
Martin Geduldig agrees that:
A defendant’s prior arrest for a serious crime can
be a major obstacle in getting reasonable bail.
Prior arrests for relatively minor crimes do not
present a great obstacle. An extended period
without any arrests and a fairly consistent work
record during that time is extremely helpful. I
had a case involving a [thirty-eight]-year-old
defendant who had been convicted as a [sixteen]
year old of attempted murder. He served a [ten]
year sentence. During the [fifteen] years he was
released, he had one drug arrest but the new
judge could not get [past] the [twenty] year old
attempted murder conviction and set a very high
bail.158
As already noted, certain charges carry with them a
157. Letter from Andrew Weinstein to authors, supra note 134.
158. Letter from Martin Geduldig to authors, supra note 137.
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rebuttable presumption of dangerousness—crimes of violence,
the use or possession of a firearm in connection with a crime of
violence, a capital offense, or a drug offense where a sentence of
ten years or more is mandated under Title 21 of the United
States Code.159 In addition, defendants charged with a crime of
violence, a capital offense, or a narcotics felony with a
minimum ten-year penalty who were “previously convicted of
or released from prison for a similar offense not more than five
years before the judicial finding”160 are presumed dangerous.
In presumption cases, the presumption shifts the burden of
production to the defendant, but the government retains the
burden of persuasion.161 Nevertheless, even if the defendant
“successfully rebuts the presumption, the fact that it was
triggered may still be considered in release or detention
determinations.”162
Since the enactment of the 1984 Act, there has been a
dramatic increase in the number of defendants denied pretrial
release, especially in narcotics cases.163 In its report, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary explained that “dangerousness”
was to be construed broadly, and emphasized that “the risk
that a defendant will continue to engage in drug trafficking
constitutes a danger to the ‘safety of any other person or the
community.’”164 Further, “[p]ersons charged with major drug
felonies are often in the business of importing or distributing
dangerous drugs, and thus because of the nature of the
criminal activity with which they are charged, they pose a
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1) (2006); see also Christopher A. Andreoff,
A Primer on Federal Criminal Procedure, 72 MICH. B.J. 60, 61 (1993).
160. Harwin, supra note 156, at 1110.
161. Andreoff, supra note 159, at 61.
162. Id.; see Harwin, supra note 156 at 1111-17 (describing cases where
the presumption, even though rebutted, provided the court with a basis for
detention).
163. Harwin, supra note 156, at 1122 n.32 (citing U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-88-6, CRIMINAL BAIL: HOW BAIL REFORM IS
WORKING IN SELECTED DISTRICT COURTS 17, 20 (1987); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-7, IMPACT OF BAIL REFORM IN
SELECTED DISTRICT COURTS 17-18 (1989); Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Forward
to Symposium, Crime Control Act of 1984, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV., at vi, viii n.4
(1985); see Thomas E. Scott, Pretrial Detention under the Bail Reform Act of
1984: An Empirical Analysis, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 22 (1989)).
164. S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3196, 1983 WL 25404, at *12-13.
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significant risk of pretrial recidivism.”165
Despite Congress’s intention that the drug presumption
should apply to “major” drug traffickers,166 the presumption’s
reliance on the prospective sentence faced by a defendant
combined with the fact that many low-level drug defendants
are charged as part of conspiracies in which the total quantity
of drugs is large, leads to the pretrial detention of numerous
non-dangerous defendants. Occasionally, these pretrial
detention orders are successfully challenged,167 but in the
authors’ experience, in many cases defendants choose not to
appeal a detention order, assuming that they will be convicted
and relying on the fact that the time they spend in custody will
ultimately be credited toward their sentence.
Courts have also begun to consider that “danger” may
include the possibility of economic harm. Thus, in United
States v. Dekhkanov,168 Judge Bianco denied pretrial release to
Mr. Dekhkanov, a twenty-five-year-old first-time offender who
was charged with conspiracy to commit mail fraud, access
device fraud, and aggravated identity theft with a loss total of
five hundred thousand dollars, despite his offer to post a four
million dollar bond secured by numerous properties and
suretors. The court found that the possibility that, if released,
Mr. Dekhkanov could continue the charged scheme, which
allegedly involved accessing information from credit cards,
posed a danger to the community.
Similarly, in high profile cases such as United States v.
Madoff,169 Judge Kaplan granted release on extremely
stringent conditions, including Mr. Madoff’s hiring a security
company to provide twenty-four-hour surveillance of his
residence. The Judge concluded that, although economic harm
might be a proper consideration with respect to detention,
165. Id. at 20.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 635 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Kan. 1986)
(The denial of pretrial release was overturned where no evidence established
that no set of conditions would reasonably assure the safety of the
community. The district court’s opinion noted that an indictment that
triggers the presumption is insufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant is a danger to the community).
168. 2:11-Cr-00581 (JFB) (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
169. 586 F. Supp. 2d 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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there was no substantial risk that Mr. Madoff would continue
to pose an economic danger to the community given the change
in his circumstances.
Bobbi Sternheim170 offers an example of a case in which
bail was denied in a presumption case, yet the defendant was
ultimately sentenced to time served:
I represented a man who was arrested because
his coat was hung in a closet above which a
locked box contained a firearm. He was charged
with a narcotics conspiracy involving a [ten]-year
mandatory minimum sentence and a 924(c)
weapons offense mandating a consecutive [five]year sentence. My client, in need of a place to
stay after having had a fight with his roommate,
paid the lessee of the apartment a weekly fee to
sleep in the apartment. My client had no keys to
the apartment. The lessee, a target of the
investigation, was the subject of a search
warrant. My client was sitting outside the
building smoking a cigarette when agents came
to execute the warrant. My client—who was not
involved in any discovery, which included
electronic and visual surveillance—answered
questions by the agents concerning the
apartment and informed the agents that he was
staying in the apartment but had not been given
keys by the lessee. He was arrested after
170. Bobbi C. Sternheim, Esq. litigates a broad range of complex
criminal matters in federal courts. She is a Fellow of the American College of
Trial Lawyers and a member of the College’s Committee on Teaching Trial
and Appellate Advocacy. She teaches trial advocacy at Pace Law School and
the Federal CJA Trial Skills Academy at California Western School of Law.
She is the Acting Director of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law’s
Intensive Trial Advocacy Program and a supervisor in Cardozo’s Criminal
Appeals Clinic. She is the Criminal Justice Act representative for the
Southern District of New York, a member of the district’s CJA Peer Review
Committee, Best Practices Committee, and Mentor Program. She also serves
on the Joint Committee for Local Rules for the Southern and Eastern
Districts of New York. She is a facilitator and presenter at continuing legal
education seminars and has provided legal commentary for print and
television media.
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issuance of the warrant when he identified his
coat after agents recovered a gun in the locked
box on a shelf above the coat. The indictment
charged more than [ten] defendants; all but my
client were Hispanic. My client was a white Jew.
Bail was denied due to the nature of the charges,
the presumptions in the Bail Reform Act relating
to mandatory minimum sentencing and because
my client has a prior felony having pled guilty to
possession of a bad check in Florida, making him
a “felon in possession” of a firearm. The
government opposed bail during my bail
application before the magistrate judge and
when I renewed my application before the
district court judge.
My client maintained his innocence throughout.
The AUSA rejected his innocence proffer as well
as my submission in support of a deferred
prosecution. As trial approached, I renewed [m]y
request for a deferred prosecution. Ultimately,
the AUSA offered a plea to a misprision of felony.
My client accepted the plea, lest he risk a
conviction at trial and a mandatory sentence of
[fifteen] years. The length of his pretrial
detention exceeded the guideline sentence for the
misprision charge and the client received a
sentence of time served.
After sentencing, the district judge asked, “How
did I miss this one?” To which I replied that had
the court heeded the argument of seasoned and
reputable defense counsel this never would have
happened.171
Where the rebuttable presumption does not operate,
171. Letter from Bobbi Sternheim to authors (Feb. 15, 2012) (on file with
authors).
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defendants are significantly more likely to be granted pretrial
release. Indeed, even arguably “dangerous” defendants facing
charges including murder, attempted murder, murder
conspiracy, gun possession, extortion, and kidnapping, have
regularly received bail in the Southern and Eastern Districts of
New York.172 In United States v. Sabhnani,173 for example, the
Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order of pretrial
detention, despite the violent nature of the charges-forced labor
and harboring illegal aliens-holding that, “it is only a limited

172. See, e.g., United States v. Modica, 09-Cr-1243 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (Mr. Modica, an alleged soldier in the Gambino Crime Family, was
charged with, inter alia, racketeering conspiracy, racketeering, illegal
gambling, extortion, and assault in aid of racketeering. Mr. Modica was
alleged to have committed five of the eighteen racketeering acts alleged in
the multi-defendant indictment including murder, jury tampering, and
obstruction of justice, yet he was released on bail. Michael Scotto, one of Mr.
Modica's co-defendants, was granted bail with a three million dollar bond.
Mr. Scotto was charged with, inter alia, racketeering conspiracy,
racketeering, extortion conspiracy, and sex trafficking of a minor); United
States v. Persico, 376 F. App’x 155 (2d Cir. 2010) (Mr. Persico, an alleged
associate in the Colombo crime family, the son of the official boss, and brother
of the acting boss, was indicted him on charges of extortion and murder
conspiracy, was released on a five million dollar bond); United States v.
Gigante, 85 F.3d 83, 84 (2d Cir. 1996) (alleged “boss” of “Genovese organized
crime family”); United States v. Spero, 99-Cr-520 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (alleged
Consigliere of Bonanno Crime Family, charged with murder and other
violence); United States v. Bellomo, 96-Cr-430 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (alleged
Genovese Acting Underboss Mickey Generoso, charged with murder
conspiracy); United States v. Fama, 95-Cr.-840 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (reputed
soldier charged with heroin distribution, kidnapping and murder); United
States v. Gregory Scarpa, Jr., 94-Cr-1119 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (accused
participant in bloody Colombo Family war); United States v. Orena, 93-Cr1366 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (reputed soldier and boss’ son, charged with murder
conspiracy and weapons possession); United States v. Failla, 93-Cr-294
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (multiple high-ranking members of Gambino Family accused,
among other charges, of killing a government witness); United States v.
Conti, 93-Cr-053 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (organized crime defendant charged with
murder and murder conspiracy); United States v. Russo, 92-Cr-529 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (alleged mafia captain charged with murder and other violent crimes);
United States v. Persico, 92-Cr-351 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (alleged mafia captain
charged with murder conspiracy in connection with internal Colombo war);
United States v. Rosenfeld, 90-Cr-755 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (defendant released on
bail despite charges of threatening one cooperator with a gun and killing
another); cf., e.g., United States v. Fiumara, 02-Cr-317 (D.N.J. 2002) (reputed
head of Genovese Family’s New Jersey faction, whose parole was revoked for
four alleged murders).
173. 493 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2007).
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group of offenders who should be denied bail pending trial.”174
Similarly, in United States v. Khashoggi,175 the district
court released Mr. Khashoggi, a wealthy Saudi Arabian
businessman facing mail fraud charges, reasoning in part that
the absence of a presumption “militat[ed] in favor of pretrial
release.”176 And, in United States v. Patriarca,177 the district
court released the alleged former head of the Patriarca crime
family on conditions of house arrest with electronic monitoring,
reasoning that conditions existed to assure the court of his
appearance and of the safety of the community.
In United States v. Rubashkin,178 Mr. Rubashkin was
charged in a 163-count Indictment alleging a massive bank
fraud, money laundering, mail fraud, wire fraud, harboring
undocumented aliens, false statements, and violations of the
Packers and Stockyards Act. Despite the breadth and the
magnitude of the charges, Mr. Rubashkin was granted bail on a
ten million dollar bond.
3. Moral Suasion
In deciding what level of bond to set, courts often look to
the persons who offer themselves as suretors for the defendant,
seeking to establish that the proposed bond will have sufficient
moral suasion over the defendant that he will not violate the
terms of his release. Where family members offer to post their
property as collateral or to co-sign a bond, a bail argument
gains persuasive force because the defense attorney is able to
demonstrate that individuals close to the defendant believe
that the defendant will not flee or endanger the community.
In United States v. Dina Wein-Reis,179 the defendant was
charged in the Southern District of Indiana with one count of
174. Id. 75 (quoting United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir.
1987)(internal quotation marks omitted)).
175. 717 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
176. Id. at 1051.
177. 776 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1991).
178. 718 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Iowa 2010).
179. United States v. Wein-Reis, No. 08-MJ-02362 (UA) (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
28, 2008).
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conspiracy to commit wire fraud and six counts of wire fraud.
She was arrested at her home in New York. Ms. Wein-Reis was
denied bail at a hearing in front of the presiding magistrate
judge in the Southern District of New York and was scheduled
to be extradited to Indiana on Wednesday, November 5, 2008.
Ms. Wein-Reis’s attorney, John Meringolo, immediately
appealed the bail denial and Judge Shira Scheindlin, the
presiding Part I Judge, specially opened the federal courthouse
in the Southern District of New York on Tuesday, November 4,
2008—Election Day—in order to hear counsel’s bail arguments,
demonstrating the fundamental importance of ensuring that a
defendant’s application for bail be heard expeditiously.180
At the bail hearing, the government argued that Ms. WeinReis should be detained because she was a risk of flight with
property in Israel and the means to flee. Ms. Reis had a home
in Israel, conducted business there, and even visited
frequently. After an extensive argument and presentation of a
substantial bail package, Judge Scheindlin granted bail on a
ten million dollar bond secured by approximately 2.5 million
dollars in property. The bail package was strengthened by Ms.
Wein-Reis’s brother’s, Hershel Wein, offer to post his home and
his annual salary—1.3 million dollars—as collateral. As
reported by the Daily News, Judge Scheindlin confirmed with
Mr. Wein that he had “[o]ne hundred percent”181 confidence
that Ms. Wein-Reis would not violate the terms of her release.
In retrospect, Judge Scheindlin’s decision was correct. Ms
Wein-Reis did not flee and complied with all bail conditions
imposed.

4. Appellate Review of Bail Denials
“To eliminate unnecessary detention, the court must

180. See Thomas Zambito, Yes, Judge, My Sister is Worth $10M, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/yesjudge-sister-worth-10m-article-1.336351.
181. Id.
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supervise the detention within the district of any defendants
awaiting trial . . . .”182 “The judicial officer may at any time
amend the order to impose additional or different conditions of
release.”183 In addition, a defendant who is denied bail by a
magistrate judge may appeal that denial to the district
judge.184 The district court may “independently review the
magistrate’s order and conduct any necessary evidentiary
hearings or receive additional affidavits.”185
As with other matters, a defendant who is denied bail by
the district court may appeal to the circuit. The 1984 Act does
not provide a standard for appellate review of bail
determinations.186 However, the Second Circuit reviews a
denial of bail for clear error, that is, the denial will be upheld
“unless ‘on the entire evidence we are left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”187
In United States v. Trucchio,188 the Second Circuit
overturned the district court and granted bail to Mr. Trucchio,
an alleged captain in the Gambino crime family who was
charged with racketeering, distribution of marijuana, cocaine,
marijuana, and ecstasy trafficking, assault in aid of
racketeering, illegal gambling, and loansharking. Mr. Trucchio
proposed a three million dollar bail package secured by real
property—homes in which he and members of his extended
family lived, and which counsel argued provided significant
moral suasion.189 The government opposed bail, arguing that
the drug trafficking charges and the resulting presumption as
well as the significant sentencing exposure made Mr. Trucchio

182. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(h)(1).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(3) (2006).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (2006).
185. Michael Edmund O’Neill, Note, A Two-Pronged Standard of
Appellate Review for Pretrial Bail Determinations, 99 YALE L.J. 885, 891
(1990).
186. See id. at 895.
187. United States v. Persico, 376 F. App’x 155, 157 (2010) (quoting
United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007)) (citation omitted).
188. United States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr-12 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,
2011). The district court revoked Trucchio’s bail following his plea of guilty.
189. Alphonse Trucchio’s Motion and Supporting Memorandum for
Release on Bail Pending Trial at 17-18, United States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr12 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2011), ECF No. 147.
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a risk of flight and a danger to the community.190
Judge Berman denied Trucchio’s motion for bail, and an
expedited appeal was taken.191 Three months later, the Second
Circuit reversed the district’s denial, and granted bail.192 Mr.
Trucchio was released on a slightly modified version of the
three million dollar bond that he originally proposed.
B. The Effect of a Denial of Bail
Despite the procedural protections in the 1984 Act, many
defense attorneys, including the Authors and others
interviewed for this Article, find that the preventive pretrial
detention provisions and the broad judicial discretion to detain
a defendant based on the perceived “risk of flight” or “danger to
the community” have a significant and detrimental impact on
every stage of the case.193
190. Government’s Motion for Detention-Defendant Alphonse Trucchio
at 12, United States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr-12 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29,
2011), ECF No. 154.
191. Docket Minute Entry, United States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr-12
(RMB) (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2011); Order, United States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr12 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2011), ECF No. 191; Notice of Appeal, United
States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr-12 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011), ECF No.
192.
192. Docket Minute Entry, United States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr-12
(RMB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011); Agreement to Forfeit Property (other than
real property) to Obtain a Defendant’s Release, United States v. Trucchio,
No. 11-Cr-12 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011), ECF No. 244.
193. See Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The
Eighth Amendment’s Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2005):
The difference between being released prior to trial and
being incarcerated often is the difference between an
acquittal and a conviction. No matter how quickly a case is
fast-tracked through the system, a detained defendant will
suffer some material harm. The defendant will be displaced
from work and familial duties, as well as suffer the stigma
of being a prisoner. But most important, a freed defendant
is able to better defend himself against the government. A
freed defendant can better assist his attorney in gathering
evidence and securing witnesses so that the government’s
burden to convict remains high. Pretrial detention severely
limits a defendant’s ability to defend himself simply because
his ability to contact the world is necessarily restricted. The
setting of bail, although “often . . . done in haste [and at
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1. Constitutional Concerns
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees a defendant the right to assist in his own
defense.194 However, when a defendant is denied bail, his
ability to assist his attorney is severely limited. Despite all
efforts to provide copies of pretrial discovery to detained
clients, inefficient mail delivery, and a lack of adequate
electronic equipment such as computers on which to listen to
recordings, make it impossible for a client to fully examine all
of the evidence produced by the government. In addition, an
attorney going over the same discovery alone is at a
disadvantage because the person best equipped to explain its
significance to him—the client—is effectively inaccessible.
Thus, the barriers between an attorney and his incarcerated
client infringe on the client’s ability to exercise his
constitutional right to assist in his own defense.195
In addition, the presumption of innocence is endangered by
pretrial incarceration of a defendant. Martin Geduldig explains
that:
The courts always try to keep a defendant’s bail
status from the jury. For those defendants who
fail to make bail and are incarcerated this effort
is never successful. Those defendants released on
bail will be seen in the halls of the court-house,
or in local restaurants during the lunch break. A
times] fixed without . . . full inquiry and much
consideration,” is one of the most crucial steps in the
administration of criminal justice. Bail should be fixed only
after careful deliberation by a neutral party. Any shortcuts
in this procedure are a direct assault on individual liberty
and should always be guarded against.
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
194. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
195. Courts have also considered the likely length of the period of
pretrial detention in assessing whether pretrial release is warranted. See,
e.g., United States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1993) (collecting
cases); United States v. Frisone, 795 F.2d 1, 1 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
United States v. Gallo, 653 F. Supp. 320, 336-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); United
States v. Scarpa, 815 F. Supp. 88, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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jury’s perception of a defendant is altered by the
fact of a defendant’s release.196
2. Practical Considerations
Andrew Weinstein explains how his ability to defend a
client is changed when bail is denied:
The ability to defend a client who is detained
pending trial is significantly hampered, which is
one of the many reasons that detention hearings
are typically vigorously litigated. As noted above,
access to a detained defendant is limited and
generally speaking, detained defendants often
suffer from diminished morale. For what would
otherwise be a one hour meeting in the attorney’s
office, counsel for a detained client will often
need to block out the better part of an entire day
for travel time to the prison, waiting to be
processed and allowed in, waiting for the client to
come down to the attorney visiting area, waiting
for “counts” to clear, meeting with the client, and
travel time back to the attorney’s office once the
meeting has concluded.
Having a detained client also makes listening to
large quantities of tape recordings together
impractical. Electronic equipment in the prisons
is out of date, in limited supply, and there are
significant restrictions that the BOP places on
inmates using such equipment. Similar
complications exist when dealing with large
“paper” cases. Often times, cases have tens or
hundreds of boxes of discovery and relevant
documents that need to be reviewed. An
organized system is easy to arrange for such
review in an attorney’s office. The same cannot
take place in a prison setting.
196. Letter from Martin Geduldig to authors, supra note 137.
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Perhaps most important is the inability to confer
with the client during overnight recesses when
on trial. The reality is that preparation time
during overnight breaks is a precious commodity.
When a client is on bail, they can return to the
attorney’s office and work into the evening with
the attorney, review documents and evidence
together with the attorney, discuss strategy for
the following day, etc. When a client is detained,
an attorney often has to make a difficult decision:
Go visit the client in jail and forego many hours
of valuable prep time in the office or spend the
time in the office preparing for the following day
and forego extensive and potentially valuable
input from the client. The prejudice suffered by a
detained client in terms of trial preparation is
very difficult to quantify; yet anyone who has
tried a case with a client who has been denied
bail would attest to the simple proposition that a
detained client is at a significant tactical
disadvantage simply as a result of being
detained.197
Martin Geduldig agrees that:
A defendant in jail is not available to readily
reach out to prospective defense witnesses with
whom he has a relationship. Telephone
conversations with a jailed defendant are very
circumscribed because of a legitimate fear that
those conversations are being recorded. This
leads to the need for more frequent jail visits,
which result in substantial periods of wasted
time traveling to and from jails and waiting for a
client to be brought to the interview room.198

197. Letter from Andrew Weinstein to authors, supra note 134.
198. Letter from Martin Geduldig to authors, supra note 137.
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James Harkins199 comments that:
It is much more difficult to work with an
incarcerated
defendant
because,
as
an
investigator, you often need access to information
that the client could easily provide if he were
released, such as phone numbers or contact
information for potential witnesses. Every step of
the process is prolonged and complicated in an
investigation for an incarcerated defendant.200
In addition, an incarcerated defendant is substantially
more likely to agree to a plea of guilty because the time spent
in pretrial detention is credited toward the eventual sentence
imposed. Therefore, rather than spending a year or more in
pretrial detention and taking the case to trial, especially when
the chance of winning a federal criminal case is less than two
percent, an incarcerated defendant has every incentive to plead
guilty and obtain a credit for the time served as well as the
customary reduction under the Sentencing Guidelines for
acceptance of responsibility.201

3. United States v. Rea,202 A Personal Example

199. James Harkins currently owns and operates a boutique private
investigator service company in New York City. Mr. Harkins is a former
decorated NYPD police officer. He won countless awards during his twenty
years on the force, including Police Officer of the Month, United States
Department of Justice Recognition Award, and Recognition Awards from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Recognition Awards from the DEA and
Exceptional and Meritorious Police Duty on sixty-one occasions. Since
retiring from the Police Department, Mr. Harkins’ company has handled
many high profile federal criminal cases around the United States.
200. Telephone Interview with James Harkins, Private Investigator
(Feb. 28, 2012).
201. See also Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 4, at 420 (noting that a
detained defendant’s ability to assist counsel is reduced).
202. No. 10-Cr-767 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010).
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In 2010, Mr. Rea was arrested at his home in Henderson,
Nevada, near Las Vegas, and charged in the Eastern District of
New York with RICO conspiracy as a member of La Cosa
Nostra, and racketeering acts including illegal gambling, the
murder of Gerard Pappa (in July 1980), conspiracy to commit
extortion of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local
807, and conspiracy to murder John Doe #1 in 1992.203
Mr. Rea was extradited to New York, where counsel
argued vigorously for bail, citing Mr. Rea’s extremely ill health
and the fact that the murder charge was thirty years old.204 Mr.
Rea suffered from diabetes and numerous complications
including diabetic neuropathy for which he was taking
prescription morphine, a drug that the Bureau of Prisons did
not allow him to continue taking while incarcerated. As a
result, Mr. Rea suffered from extreme pain during the few
weeks of his pretrial incarceration. In addition he had recently
undergone laparoscopic surgery and required a special diet.
Moreover, he was a caregiver to his two minor non-biological
grandchildren, whose mother was unable to provide for them.
Considering all of these factors, as well as the significant bail
package proposed—three million dollars secured by property—
Magistrate Joan Azrack agreed that Mr. Rea should be
released on bond.205
Thereafter, discovery provided by the government and
counsel’s investigation demonstrated that the charges against
Mr. Rea were unsubstantiated by the evidence. Just two
months later, on January 3, 2011, the government advised
counsel that it was dropping the murder charge.206 After
203. See John Marzulli, Reputed Bonanno Crime Soldier Armando Rea
Charged in 1980 Slay of Mafia Hitman, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 15, 2010,
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-10-15/news/29440390_1_pappa-gravanogenovese-mobster-gerard; Jerry Capeci, Bonanno Wiseguy Nabbed In 30Year-Old Mob Rubout, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2010, 11:30 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerry-capeci/post_1126_b_773196.html.
204. Defendant Armando Rea’s Memorandum of Law in Support of
Omnibus Discovery Motion, United States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr-767 (JBW)
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2010), ECF No. 5; Calendar: Magistrate’s Proceeding,
United States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr-767 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010), ECF No.
9.
205. Calendar: Magistrate’s Proceeding, supra note 204.
206. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr-767
(JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011), ECF No. 44.
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significant pretrial arguments and after jury selection, the
Honorable Jack B. Weinstein suppressed numerous tape
recordings and agreed to reopen a hearing as to whether Mr.
Rea’s pre- and post-arrest statements should be suppressed
because he was denied his right to counsel when arrested in
Nevada. On the morning of his scheduled trial, February 15,
2011, Mr. Rea was offered and accepted a plea to a single count
of conspiracy to commit extortion.207 On May 23, 2011, Judge
Weinstein sentenced Mr. Rea, who had originally faced a
sentence of life in prison, to five years of probation.208
In the Authors’ opinion, the fact that Mr. Rea was released
on bail and the resulting ability of counsel to meet with him
often, to review the evidence, and to avail themselves of his
assistance in gathering evidence to disprove the government’s
original narrative, was essential to the outcome of the case. 209
4. The Effect of Affluence—Recent High Profile Defendants
on Bail
Recently, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York
have released several high profile defendants on bail subject, in
some cases, to provisions so extreme that they amounted to the
creation of private detention facilities in the defendants’ homes.
For instance, in the cases of Bernard Madoff210 and Marc
Dreier,211 the court released the defendants to their own homes,
but required them, in addition to other stringent release
conditions, to hire twenty-four-hour security personnel to
207. Waiver of Indictment, United States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr-767 (JBW)
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011), ECF No. 92; Superseding Information, United
States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr-767 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011), ECF No. 93;
Criminal Cause for Pleading or Repleading, United States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr767 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011), ECF No. 94.
208. Criminal Cause for Sentencing, United States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr-767
(JBW) (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011), ECF No. 100.
209. Had Mr. Rea remained incarcerated during the pretrial period, it is
likely that counsel would have spent numerous hours on auxiliary matters,
such as letters to the Bureau of Prisons regarding Mr. Rea’s health.
Consequently, continued pretrial incarceration would have had a negative
impact on Mr. Rea’s ability to defend himself and adequately exercise his
constitutional rights.
210. United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
211. United States v. Dreier, 596 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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monitor them. As Jonathan Zweig has noted, such detention
orders, which are only available to very wealthy defendants,
may be unconstitutional in their own right.212 In contrast,
defendants of lesser means who face similar charges have a
much more difficult bail argument to make, and are likely to be
denied pretrial release.213 The unequal treatment afforded to
some wealthy defendants calls into question the
constitutionality of the courts’ decisions to release those
individuals, despite those decisions’ compliance with the 1984
Act’s mandate that a defendant be released on “personal
recognizance,” or on the “least restrictive . . . condition, or
combination of conditions, that [the] judicial officer determines
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required and the safety of any other person and the
community.”214
a.

Bernard Madoff

In Mr. Madoff’s case, the government and the defense
agreed on an initial set of bail conditions that were made
possible by Mr. Madoff’s wealth.215 These conditions included
the following: a ten million dollar personal recognizance bond
secured by properties and suretors; the filing of confessions of
judgment with respect to four properties; twenty-four-hoursper-day electronic monitoring at Mr. Madoff’s home, with
release only for court appearances; the surrender of passports
belonging to Mr. Madoff and his wife; and the condition that
Mr. Madoff employ, “at his wife’s expense, a security firm
acceptable to the Government, to provide” twenty-four-hour
monitoring of Mr. Madoff’s apartment building and doors, with
communication devices providing a direct link to the FBI and
additional guards as requested to “prevent harm or flight.”216
212. Jonathan Zweig, Note, Extraordinary Conditions of Release Under
the Bail Reform Act, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 555, 574-76, 582 (2010).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Dekhkanov, No. 11-Cr-581 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
17, 2011).
214. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)-(c) (2006), held unconstitutional by United
States v. Karper, No. 11-Cr-103 (TJM/RFT), 2011 WL 7451512 (N.D.N.Y.
Aug. 10, 2011).
215. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
216. Id. at 244-45.
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These conditions were later amended to include
restrictions on the transfer of any property, and requirements
that Mr. Madoff compile an inventory, to be checked once every
two weeks, of all valuable portable items in his home.217
In releasing Mr. Madoff to bail, the court wrote:
The issue at this stage of the criminal
proceedings is not whether Madoff has been
charged in perhaps the largest Ponzi scheme
ever, nor whether Madoff’s alleged actions should
result in his widespread disapprobation by the
public, nor even what is appropriate punishment
after conviction. The legal issue before the Court
is whether the Government has carried its
burden of demonstrating that no condition or
combination of conditions can be set that will
reasonably assure Madoff’s appearance and
protect the community from danger.218
The court then found that the government had not met
that burden, and that the conditions were sufficient to meet the
requirements of the 1984 Act.
b.

Marc Dreier

In Mr. Dreier’s case, the court found that the government
had proven that the defendant would pose a risk of flight if
released without conditions.219 However, Judge Rakoff found
that Dreier’s proposed bail package was sufficient to minimize
the flight risk.220 The package included the following: a ten
million dollar personal recognizance bond co-signed by the
defendant’s son and mother; no computer access; surrender of
travel documents; screening and searching of all visitors (who
were to be pre-approved); strict Pretrial Services supervision;
cooperation with a receiver to identify and preserve all assets;
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 243-44.
Id. at 246 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006)).
United States v. Dreier, 596 F. Supp. 2d 831, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Id.
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and “home detention, 24/7, in his East Side apartment, secured
not only by electronic monitoring but by on-premises armed
security guards, supplied by a company acceptable to the
Government but paid for by the defendant’s relatives.”221
The court found it to be “a serious flaw in our system” that
wealthy defendants are able to obtain release because of their
ability to pay for private monitoring; however, such flaws are
“not a reason to deny a constitutional right to someone who, for
whatever reason, can provide reasonable assurances against
flight.”222
c.

Robert Allen Stanford

In contrast to Mr. Madoff and Mr. Dreier, Mr. Stanford
was denied bail numerous times.223 Mr. Stanford was charged
with twenty-one counts including, inter alia, wire fraud, mail
fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, money
laundering, and obstructing an SEC investigation.224 The
magistrate and district judges hearing Mr. Stanford’s case
found that he presented a serious risk of flight and denied
pretrial release. Mr. Stanford is a citizen of the United States
and of Antigua and Barbuda who had lived primarily outside of
the United States for the fifteen years prior to the filing of an
SEC proceeding against him. He had numerous foreign bank
accounts, and traveled extensively internationally.225

221. Id. Nonetheless, the court imposed additional conditions on Mr.
Drier, including the following requirements: “express[] consent in writing to
the use, by the armed security guards, of ‘temporary preventive detention
and the use of reasonable force’ to thwart any attempt to flee;” payment of
three months’ worth of costs for the security guards into an escrow account;
removal of all electronic communication devices, other than a single land-line
telephone, and anything that “might serve as a weapon;” maintenance of a
land-line phone; payment of electronic monitoring costs; and denial of all
visitors who had not obtained “the express prior written permission of the
Pre-Trial Services officer, given only after consultation with the U.S.
Attorney’s Office.” Id. at 834.
222. Id. at 833.
223. United States v. Stanford, 367 F. App’x 507 (5th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Stanford, 341 F. App’x 979 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Stanford, 630 F. Supp. 2d 751 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
224. Stanford, 367 F. App’x at 507.
225. Stanford, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 752-54.
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Stanford challenged his detention on constitutional
grounds, arguing that the detention was “excessively
prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress’s
regulatory goal.”226 Given that a trial date had been set,227 that
Mr. Sanford had previously sought extensions of that trial date
based on the complexity of the case, and that the government
had not tactically delayed the trial date, the court rejected
Stanford’s argument that pretrial release was appropriate.228
The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of Stanford’s
pretrial release, and the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.229
IV. Alternatives to Pretrial Incarceration
When the court finds that pretrial detention is not
warranted, the 1984 Act provides several options for release,
from the most lenient—release on personal recognizance—to
the more stringent imposition of a series of conditions intended
to ensure that the defendant will not flee or pose a danger to
the community. The options most often granted include release
on recognizance, the imposition of a curfew (possibly with
electronic or GPS monitoring), and home detention. In
addition, whether the defendant is released on his own
recognizance or on a more restricted basis, courts almost
always impose standard conditions of release, such as
monitoring by Pretrial Services, drug testing, and travel
restrictions. These conditions, while onerous in their own right,
are far preferable to detention, and a defendant who is granted
pretrial release, even on stringent conditions, is in a far better
position to fight his case and exercise his constitutional rights.
Conclusion

226. United States v. Stanford, 722 F. Supp. 2d 803, 806, 808 (S.D. Tex.
2010) (internal brackets omitted) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 747 (1987)).
227. The total pretrial incarceration was approximately nineteen
months. Id.
228. Id. at 807-11.
229. Stanford v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1028 (2011); United States v.
Stanford, 394 F. App’x 72 (5th Cir. 2010).
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The denial of pretrial release has a profound impact on
every stage of a defendant’s case, including the ultimate
outcome. Incarcerated defendants are hampered in their ability
to assist in their own defense, and are more likely to plead
guilty and to be sentenced to longer terms of incarceration. In
providing for preventive pretrial detention based on
“dangerousness,” as well as the traditional ground of “risk of
flight,” the 1984 Act shifted the playing field for defense
attorneys and their clients away from the pursuit of justice and
toward the expedient resolution of cases.
Moreover, because more defendants are now increasingly
likely to be denied pretrial release, the government’s
bargaining position is enhanced in plea negotiations, where
incarcerated defendants are promised time off in exchange for
their cooperation or plea of guilty. Incarcerated pretrial
defendants, who understand that the time that they are
serving can only benefit them if they plead guilty, are less
likely to exercise their right to trial, and more likely to resolve
the case without full exercise of the constitutional protections
to which they are entitled.
As the defense attorneys cited in this Article have
explained, and in the Authors’ experience, not only is the
denial of bail on grounds of dangerousness a significant
impediment to the thorough investigation and defense to which
every defendant is entitled, it also calls into question the
ability of the 1984 Act to protect the rights of the defendants
affected by its provisions. Although the goals of the 1984 Act
were understandable at the time of enactment, the time has
come for a reappraisal of the federal bail system and of the
practical effect of the 1984 Act at all stages of criminal
prosecution.
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